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Abstract
The OSI and the TCP/IP models divide computing communications into specific groups of activities that facilitate
networking and communication. The models represent a theoretical and a pragmatic representation respectively of
the systems and both provide security schema for protecting the services. In this exploratory literature research we
asked; What are the security requirements for protection at OSI Layer 2? The hypothesis is that low level
vulnerability adversely affects higher Layer security. The OSI model is selected to theoretically test the hypothesis
and to answer the research question. The research shows that the precautions advocated in the OSI model are
helpful but developing forensic capability and obfuscation within Layer 2 further reduces the impact of unplanned
events. A survey of attacks confirms previous literature that suggest Layer 2 has vulnerabilities and innovative
solutions are required.
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INTRODUCTION
Security is only as good as the weakest link and if the weakness is at a low level in the communication stack then
every other Layer has potential to inherit the problem. The OSI Layer model has defined the theoretical architecture
for network communications (ISO/IEC 7498-1). Standardisation assures that each element of an internetwork uses
the same model and hence a message can be moved intelligibly and correctly between participants. The OSI model
divides communications into seven hierarchical Layers that provide the necessary services from the application
Layer through to the physical Layer of electricity (ISO/IEC 7498-2). Each Layer is dependent on the one below to
provide the more primitive functions and is hence interconnected from top to bottom in a communication chain. The
four Layer TCP/IP pragmatic model conveys a similar relationship of dependant services for communication that
have inter-dependence (Comer, 1995). The consequence is that no matter how a communication stack is looked at –
theoretically or in practice – problems low down impact higher Layers. In this research we looked specifically at
the OSI Data Link Layer (2) not only because so much has been written on security issues at this Layer, but also
because it is the first Layer where serious abstraction in terms of logics and protocols is made from the primitive
physical impulses (Altunbasak et al., 2005; NIST, 2013). These theoretical abstractions offer opportunity for proper
and improper manipulation that may either better facilitate communication or impede effective communication. The
data link Layer also gives opportunity for a range of logical attacks that may exploit the effective communication
but not always for the intended purposes. Such vulnerabilities occur elsewhere in the communication stack but
Layer 2 is the first real opportunity for logical attacks (Shanmug et al, 2010; Altunbasak, et al., 2005).
This paper is structured to briefly review current literature and define the implications of OSI Layer 2 security
vulnerabilities. The OSI model is selected in preference over the TCP/IP model as it has greater clarity around
specific layers and reference detail. Two gaps in the literature are identified and theoretical solutions proposed for
Layer 2 security.

LAYER 2 VULNERABILITY
The data link layer (2) is positioned to make the bits received from the physical layer (1) reliable and useable in the
Layer 2 and network layer (3). This is principally achieved by enforcing security in the layer protocols that assure
error detection and control. The five pervasive security requirements for each communication are (Nikkel, 2007):






Authentication – insurance of the identity of what is being communicated and the parties communicating.
Access Control – pertaining to the level of availability of information based upon security credentials
Data Confidentiality – the means of assurance that no unauthorized party can gain access to information
either in transit or stasis.
Data Integrity – when information is accessed or transmitted, this security measure ensures that the
communication confirms the data has not been tampered with.
Nonrepudiation – ensures that the data was received by the proper party involved with the communication
and that access to the information cannot be denied by an entity involved in the transfer.
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There are also specific security mechanisms implemented at the protocol level of a service in Layer 2. These include
synchronisation recognition; flow control; error correction; address audit; control and data links; and, link
management procedures (Convey, 2014).
There are at least 14 published and documented attacks on Layer 2 communications (Singh et al., 2015; .Senecal,
2006). Some of the more publicised ones are MAC address spoofing and VLAN hopping. Layer 2 can be influenced
by simplistic attacks at layer 1 which in themselves are passed up the stack. These attacks can include attacks on the
physical Ethernet cables, signal jamming, eavesdropping or injections; and theft or damage of equipment. Layer 2
however is more sophisticated and logical in construction. A layer 2 attack requires a high level of intelligence and
good knowledge of what is going on in the communication actions. Some attacks simply put the network into an
unstable state and effectively disrupt the communications. This type of attack is irritating and resource costly rather
than disclosing message contents. It can also open other vulnerabilities for exploitation. The MAC flooding attack is
an example. More intelligent message attacks are designed to learn legitimate media access control (MAC)
addresses and then exploit the knowledge by substituting fake addresses, substituting information or gaining access
to a LAN device. Similarly the spanning tree protocol (RSTP) can be exploited by spoofed frames that manipulate
the bridging number. Such an attack allows traffic sniffing. Probably the second most widely publicised
vulnerability is VLAN hopping. This attack allows the adversary to send traffic from one VLAN to another without
the use of a router and the usual security features. A VLAN is a virtualised local area network that has been created
to logically (rather than physically) divide a network into efficient service units. These VLANS contain the controls
for network devices and protocols that are rich targets for hackers. The success of such an attack opens a network to
resource exploitation, data leakage and service hijacking. An incomplete list of Layer 2 attacks would include
(Reed, 2004):















Frame spoofing
Frame forwarding
Spanning Tree injection
Device removal or destruction
Link unplugging
MAC Flooding
MAC Spoofing
Root Hijacking
Root injection
Topology refits
VLAN hopping
Admin Hijacking
Filter injection
Port mapping and disabling

INNOVATIVE SOLUTIONS
Two innovative solutions are proposed based on the vulnerabilities for Layer 2 reported in the literature. The
security solutions are in addition to those reported in the literature and reflect directions more recent network
management practice has moved in responses to relentless cyber-attacks. It is inevitable that security breaches will
occur at Layer 2 given the number of possibilities, the value of the target, and the challenges network security
managers face to protect the Layer. Consequently the first innovation is to develop forensic (post-event) capabilities
so that the system may learn from successful attacks and attempt to identify attackers (Endicott et al., 2007; Kushik
et al., 2010; Nikkel, 2005; Rowlinson, 2004). Secondly if the Layer is masked or obscured from external
communications then the possibility of compromise is reduced. These two innovative solutions are specified in the
following two sub-sections.
Forensic Capabilities
Layer 2 has a range of forensic opportunities that may be structured for the retention and interrogation of data. Each
of the standardised actions in Layer 2 have the potential for evidence retention. For example, the primitive bits sent
up from Layer 1 are framed at Layer 2 and these frames may be sent to another host on Layer 2 or passed up to
Layer 3 for routing. The exact time a frame is moved can be established, the content of the frame noted, the way the
frame is to travel through the network, and the time it is received. Such information is helpful in a digital
investigation and useful for tracing information flow in a network. The data can report the tracing and tracking of
both legitimate and malicious uses of the network. In the first instance factual information on the use of devices
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connected to a LAN or VLAN may be obtained to see and to manage optimal pathways for higher users and others
on the network. When malicious traffic is detected such as floods and spoofs of MAC addresses then evidence can
be retained for future attack proofing. The Layer 2 forensic opportunities require preparation and a secure system
can benefit retrospectively from the innovation of such a capability.
The forensic analysis of Layer 2 security vulnerabilities shows that much evidence is left after an attack that can be
used to harden the system or to track down offenders. Tracking offenders is not always an option on account of
network irregularities and obfuscation used by skilled attackers but in some instances trace-back methodologies and
footprint histories can be followed. One of the fundamental actions of the data link Layer is to enframe bits and to
send the frame to other hosts in the Layer. This action has many useful forensic properties. The properties include
the origination time, the header and payload content, the network path, and the receiving time. If the frame is
captured at the target host then exact times may be gained but if this is not possible then a time period may be
calculated. The filter database retains timestamp information that shows when particular MAC addresses sent traffic
and on which port it was received. The filter database aging time also provides a metric that reports when a MAC
address last sent traffic (subtract the time it was removed from the database). In this way a communication between
any two addresses can be established. The Spanning Tree also retains the path a frame took and this can be verified
against data in the filter database of all network switches. Allowing for exceptions, redundancies in the filter
database and the spanning tree; and the flooding effect of a new MAC address, the method provides evidential
retention once coded and implemented.
MAC flooding is the sending of an excessive number of frames with different source MAC addresses that overflow
the Filter Database of a switch. A switch usually recognises each new MAC address and enters it into the database.
However the attack is designed to overwhelm the usual activity and to disrupt the normal network actions. Defence
against the attack also provides a forensic capability. When a normal frequency is benchmarked for the Layer 2 the
abnormal may be detected and immediately traced back to the source. The source may not always be the perpetrator
but it will always lead to the vulnerability and the protocol breach. By monitoring the number of changes in the
database for each port the attacker port can be identified and shut down. Some proprietary switches defend and
provide forensic evidence by sending a log message when the number of learned MAC addresses on a port exceeds
a specified number. This feature allows rapid detection and trace back without the use of the database filter
information. Similarly MAC address spoofing provides forensic capability for an investigator and a network
administrator. The vulnerability can be retraced with the Filter Database and is visible in MAC addresses that keep
switching between two ports. The rate of the switching is determined by how often the victim is sending the traffic.
A similar effect is observed when a host is disconnected and then reconnected. However, the Link Operational
Status changes from up to down before the MAC appears in the Filter Database under a new port in a disconnection;
but in a spoofing attack the old interface stays in an up state and the MAC switches between two ports. The access
port for the attack can be traced by the chronological order of entries in the Filter Database. The first entry is the
genuine client and the later the attacker. In some instances an attacker stages a series of ploys to disrupt this pattern
(for example does a disconnection before attack) and skilful detection and forensic analysis is dependent on the
network administrator knowing the benchmark metrics for the network. Similar analysis can be applied to other
attack scenarios and the variations within the Layer 2 processes noted. For example VLAN hopping, flooding and
topology refit forensic analysis. For each of the attacks listed the following data should be retained for forensic
capability.
VLAN hopping





Interface role
Interface VLAN ID
Implementation version
Traffic filter

Ethernet protocol










Frame header
Interface address
Duplex
Link operation status
Speed
Physical Layout
Traffic filter
Implementation version
Traffic counter
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Address bridging

















Aging time
Bridge address
Bridge identifier
Bridge priority
Filter database
Port identifier
Port number
Port path
Port priority
Port state
Root path
TNC received
Port role
Root bridge
Implementation version
Bridge log

Hiding Layer 2 from View
Much literature is found regarding hiding of data and network components. Some of the literature concerns fake
files and others architectural ploys to obfuscate the communication from critical network components. Honey pots
for example are configured to trap and observe user behaviour before access is authorised to secure resources.
Firewalls are a common network device that is deployed to filter communications and to prevent malicious or
adversary communications from entering the LAN or private network. Cryptographic methods are also widely used
to protect data and to maintain the security of communications. At Layer 2 however many attacks can circumvent
the best laid defences and alternative strategies are required. One possibility is to mask an entire network at Layer 2
(LAN or VLAN) so that the network is invisible. There are several architectural designs to achieve the obfuscation
and relatively few additional components or preparation to be applied.
One solution is to buffer a LAN or VLAN by receiving each native MAC address from the network and
cryptographically replace the native MAC with a substitute MAC. The mechanism maintains the key and algorithm
so that any request for the related service can be correctly matched in decryption but no agency can penetrate the
design within the Layer 2. The mechanism also provides traffic management for Layer 2 so that a flooding attack or
tree poisoning could be prevented before inception or rapidly stopped if started. This type of security within the
Layer 2 functionality is not well developed in the security literature and yet it has great potential to protect and
secure the stack low down. The primary inhibitors of these counter measures at such a low level has been the
unavailability of sufficient processing power (and memory) and hence the addition would add potential costs to
switches and/or routers. However, recent availability of Layer 3 switches (incorporating Layer 2 functionality) and
the improvement of materials for information storage and processing, make the concept viable. Protection within the
layer is achieved at Layer 6 with SSL/TSL security protocols and it would appear from the literature reviewed that
appropriate security features can be added to Layer 2. The concept has the potential to design multiple virtual
security walls around any network. For example multiple fake LANs can be host either inside or outside firewalls
based on the substitute MAC addresses. Similarly multiple fake VLANs can be hosted to protect a VLAN that is
only accessible by authorised keys. The conceptual design is not new for security architecture but the application
within Layer 2 is innovative. Similarly the concept of developing multiple LANs/VLANs to hide a native one is
innovative and made possible through these analyses. Many similar schema can be found at higher Layers in the
stack but in general Layer 2 is under-resourced in terms of global security mechanisms.

DISCUSSION
The Layer 2 vulnerabilities have led to vender innovations that provide protection from many of the described
attacks. Switches and integrated routers are wise to the weaknesses and provide optional functions that - when
switched on – provide a first layer of defence. For example the CISCO bridge protocol data unit filter-guard, logs
TNC traffic so that the source of an attack may be retraced to the point of attacker connection. However bigger steps
can be taken to stop attacks getting inside or sniffing communication packets. Monitoring network traffic is termed
sniffing and it provides the sniffer with a wealth of knowledge about the message contents. Layer 2 has tables of
information that are checked to identify a host to which the information is to be forwarded. If a host is not found
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then a message is broadcast to locate the destination host. The system is relatively secure but three main sniffing
attacks are documented. First two concern manipulation of the two tables (CAM and ARP) and the third
exploitation of the port data. The Address Resolution Protocol is vulnerable to address spoofing allowing the sniffer
to position between the targets and forwarding hosts. The Content Addressable Memory is similarly vulnerable to
flooding or overloading to the point of invoking a general broadcast and message disclosure. Port stealing also
occurs as a consequence of flooding and allows the attacker to listen to information before forwarding. Traditional
protection against these attacks is simple. In the first instance tie the physical ports to MAC addresses. In the second
have static ARP entries, and third monitor ARP traffic. It is expected these security procedures are followed but the
short-coming is that these procedures are well known and adversaries have developed countermeasures.
Consequently we have made two suggestions based on the literature reviewed to further harden Layer 2 defences.
Many defence systems rely on formalised procedures and industry or International Standards to set the ground rules
for engagement. However adversaries are wise to these positions and plan ahead to defeat the defences. Innovation,
mobility and flexibility are also required in addition to the traditional defence positions, postures and standardised
adoptions. Innovation can only be found in research that is prepared to look for better designs and processes that
will out play adversaries. The innovations we suggest insist that forensic capability is a mandatory component of
protection so that after an event the system can be better presented; and the perpetrator be traced for accountability.
The strength the first innovation adds to a system is the disclosure of an adversary so the adversary (human or
machine) may be known and secondly the security agency can learn from the adversary and harden their system
from further similar vulnerability. The second innovation is to acknowledge adversaries exist but to trick them into
taking low value options in fake environments. This can be achieve by inserting a suitable protocol for information
management and cryptographic protection within the Layer 2 as a functionality (and with suitable physical
resources) so an adversary will only ever see fake LAN/VLAN resources. This suggestion is over and above current
functionality in the area and adds value by obfuscation capability. The objective is to hide the native resources at
Layer 2 completely and to provide an adversary with multiple fake environments in which they experience
satisfying learning and rewards that are of low or no value to the system. The limitations are found in the readiness
of a system to take on the extra processing loads and the tendency for security managers to use exteriorities to the
layer as the primary defence. Future research can involve the design, build and test of these theoretical innovation in
practice. Also the theoretical scope of this work is not closed and further investigation can be made into the
potential for innovation or changes in current protection practices.

CONCLUSION
The data link Layer 2 of the OSI communications model has many documented vulnerabilities that require redress.
Most vendor supplied hardware and software has options to defend the attacks but the system weakness is often the
security management preparation. Knowing a network and benchmarking the performance of the security
mechanisms, services and protocols is the beginning of an assured system. The theoretical research reported in this
paper suggests that more can be done to protect communications. The two innovations require the addition of
retention and analysing capability at Layer 2 for forensic purposes; and the production of fake LAN/VLANs from
within Layer 2 to mask and hide the often open workings of Layer 2 functionalities. The future proofing of Layer 2
security can be achieved by focusing on perfecting mechanisms within the Layer, by continuing to ask questions,
and by continuous quality improvement.
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